On the Evolutionary Fitness of Bounded Rationality: Heterogeneous Populations in Antagonistic Interactions
DOI : 10.3844/ajassp.2005.1.13
American Journal of Applied Sciences
Volume 2, Issue 13
Conventional game theory assumes hyper-rational players, while evolutionary game theory abandons the assumption. This paper studies what happens when agents of both profiles co-exist and get engaged in a series of antagonistic interactions (the Hawk-Dove game). It is shown that if rational agents are perfectly informed as to the type of their opponent, they find it optimal to always be aggressive (that is, always select Hawk) when paired with an irrational player. It is then shown that, generally, a similar result is also valid when rational agents fail to recognise the type of their opponent with certainty. Finally, a discussion on why it may be fruitful to consider populations heterogeneous as to the rationality of agents is provided.
© 2005 Tassos Patokos. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.